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“RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,” THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE, AND GIFTS:
ON WHY THE CHURCH IS NOT A BOMB SHELTER
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN*
I.
IN 2007, I published a paper bearing the formidable title, The DecreasingOntological Density of the State in Catholic Social Doctrine.1  In more modest
terms, the thesis of that mostly descriptive paper was that, over the course
of the last century and the beginning of this one, much thinking in a Cath-
olic idiom has downgraded the state.  Many welcomed the possibility of such
a downgrading, while others considered it ominous.  I was on the fence,
though inclined in the latter direction.  Further reflection and study have
confirmed me in the judgment that the downgraded state, a merely “in-
strumentalist” state—as it is sometimes called, without a trace of the pejo-
rative—is untenable, for both natural and supernatural reasons.
Some background and context will help to set the stage for the cur-
rent inquiry.  The eminent twelfth-century English jurist John of Salisbury
developed the image of the “body politic” to describe, in an unprece-
dented way, the relationship between civil society, the state, on the one
hand, and ecclesiastical society, the Church, on the other.  This image
structured most Catholic thought on the topic of “Church and state” until
recently.  According to traditional Catholic thought, the state is nothing
less (or other) than the body politic of which the Church is the soul, which
together constitute a single unity of order.2  My earlier paper, echoing in
part work by Russell Hittinger, undertook to demonstrate that recent
Catholic thinking, including that of some of the more recent Popes, has
* John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law,
Villanova University School of Law.  An early version of this paper was presented at
the Roman Forum in Gardone Riviera, Italy, in July 2012, and I am grateful for its
warm reception there and especially for the questions and suggestions of John
Rao, Brian McCall, Chris Ferrara, and Monsignor Barreira.  This revised version of
the paper was delivered at the Seventh Annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law,
Politics, and Culture at Villanova Law School, on September 14, 2012.
1. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in
Catholic Social Doctrine, 52 VILL. L. REV. 253 (2007).  An early version of the paper
was presented at the First Annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and
Culture, at which the late Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., gave the keynote address and
defended the thesis that the Church now teaches that the state is an instrument of
civil society.  Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., The Indirect Mission of the Church to Political
Society, 52 VILL. L. REV. 241 (2007).
2. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 286–92 (1983).  Jacques Maritain is among the most
prominent Catholic dismantlers of this model. See JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND
THE STATE 9–19 (1951).  When I wrote The Decreasing Ontological Density paper, I was
still heavily influenced by Maritain’s thought on this cluster of ideas.
(437)
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sought to shrink the substance, scope, and end of the state, or, in a word,
to de-substantiate the state.3  I meant to sound something of a warning.
To separate the soul from the body is, after all, the very definition of
death.  Which is why Blessed Pope Pius IX condemned so strenuously the
proposition that “the Church ought to be separated from the State, and
the State from the Church.”4
In light of the foregoing, the issue I would like to pursue here, more
than suggestively as I did in that earlier paper, is whether the downgraded
state—the ontologically emaciated state—of recent coinage can bear the
weighty office assigned to the state by permanently valid tenets of Catholic
doctrine.5  The Catholic tradition of reflection on the state is not static,
but it does include elements and permanently valid ideals that are not
subject to revision, even if their application will vary by time and place.
One of these is that the state is responsible, first, for the temporal common
good, not merely for keeping the peace and preventing rampant violation
of the harm principle, and, second, for collateral assistance to the Church
in her distinct, superior, and ultimate mission of saving souls.
3. My title was a variation on part of a sentence by Russell Hittinger: “In twen-
tieth-century Catholic thought, one detects a steady deterioration of any ontologi-
cal density to the state.”  Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1
THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 3,
22 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., 2006).  As Hittinger explains
(approvingly):
On the part of the states, the solution would require not only jettisoning
the idea that the modern state is a sanctum in the medieval sense of the
term; it also pointed to the need for what the famous Catholic social theo-
rist and politician Luigi Sturzo (1871–1959) termed a “rhythm of social
duality.”  Society is neither a creature of the state nor the church.  It is
not a ‘depersonalized whole’ capacitated to act only through the super-
structure of ecclesiastical or civil administration.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
4. POPE PIUS IX, SYLLABUS OF ERRORS No. 55 (1864).
5. As Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani wrote,
These principles [regarding Church and state] are firm and immovable.
They were valid in the times of Innocent III and Boniface VIII.  They are
valid in the days of Leo XIII and of Pius XII, who has reaffirmed them in
more than one of his documents.
. . . .
I am certain that no one can prove that there has been any kind of
change, in the matter of these principles, between the Summi pontificatus
of Pius XII and the encyclicals of Piux XI, Divini Redemptoris against Com-
munism, Mit brennender Sorge against Nazism, and Non abbiamo bisogno
against the state monopoly of facism, on the one hand; and the earlier
encyclicals of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, Libertas, and Sapientiae christianiae,
on the other.
“The ultimate, profound, lapidary fundamental norms of society,”
says the august Pontiff [Pius XII] in his Christmas radio-message of 1942,
“cannot be damaged by the intervention of man’s genius.  Men can deny
them, ignore them, despise them, disobey them, but they can never abro-
gate them with juridical efficacy.”
Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the
Teachings of Pope Pius XII, 128 AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 321, 328–29 (1950).
2
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My question is what the Catholic tradition teaches about how we ought
to think about the state, and the contemporary fact of the so-called contra-
ceptive mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes
this an opportune time to recall and recover aspects of the permanently
valid ideal taught by the Church.  I will argue that it is not enough for the
Church to be exempted from this law, so as to preserve her internal free-
dom; the Church’s mission includes correcting and transforming the state
and civil society for the common good, not just staying at liberty within
herself.  The latter is necessary but not sufficient.
II.
I should pause here to anticipate the response of some people who
would look exclusively to political philosophy or to whatever else, but cer-
tainly not to Church doctrine, to learn what the nature of the state is, if
they even believe that the state has a “nature” anymore.  The Church and
faithful Catholics must resist the fallacy behind this diversion away from
doctrine, however, and for reasons that go to the heart of the matter.  For
the last two thousand years, before any particular state came into exis-
tence, the Church was already founded, and from the time of her found-
ing, the Church has provided, among other things, a limit to the state.
Because of the Church, the state cannot be all in all.  As Pierre Manent has
written, “the political development of Europe”—but not just of Europe—
“is understandable only as the history of answers to problems posed by the
Church.”6  To a world that once contained only one perfect society, the
state, another perfect society, the Church, was added for the rest of time,
and “the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.”7  Without reference to
the Church’s self-understanding and correlative understanding of what is
not the Church, the state cannot but risk usurping what is not its own and
pursuing ends that are ultra vires.  Needless to say, states have not generally
leapt to embrace the other perfect society in her wholeness, viewing her
instead as the “problem” Manent reported.  And so the Church has
worked out countless different relations with countless different states,
some of them better for the Church’s mission than others.  Concordats
constitute one category of mutual accommodation that the Church has
often pursued.
None of this is to say that the magisterium of the Church cannot err
as it attempts prudently to determine how best to apply unchangeable ele-
ments of tradition in concrete historical circumstances.  It is to say, how-
ever, that the nature of the state cannot now be accurately established
without attention to the Church and what she says about who she is and,
correlatively, about what everything else, including the state, can or can-
not be.  Before the inruption of the Church into salvation history, Greek
6. PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LIBERALISM 4 (Rebecca Balin-
ski trans., 1994).
7. Matthew 16:18.
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and Roman philosophers (and others) were free, indeed obliged, to spec-
ulate about the nature of the state without regard to what did not yet exist.
After the founding of the Church at Pentecost, however, the nature of the
state is radically altered, though you would hardly know as much from the
decreasing ontological density of the state in some recent Catholic social
thought.  And this, inevitably, is the context in which we consider the
problem of the state today.
The crux of the matter is the following: “If we ask a modern person
who or what is sovereign, he or she would not say ‘reason,’ ‘the individual,’
or ‘science,’” let alone God, “but instead, without hesitation, ‘the state.’”8
The modern mind says this not about the corpus mysticum that was the or-
ganic union of the Catholic Church and the Catholic state, not about the
absolute regimes that followed historically, but, ironically, about the mod-
ern nation state that has given up all pretense to rule in the name of a
higher power in order, instead, relentlessly to expand its jurisdiction so as
to achieve its new and substitute end of being an almost infinitely pliable
conduit for the self-assertion of endlessly revisable selves.  The dangerous
irony to be confronted here is that what some magisterial documents cele-
brate as a mere instrumentalist state—what Pope Pius XII in Summi Pontifi-
catus referred to as “quasi instrumentum”9—ought instead to be feared.
Why?  Because the instrument has morphed from being the servant of the
common good, of the bonum honestum as the ancients called it, into being
the roving and armed agent of inexorable majority will.  Paradoxically, the
ontologically emaciated, de-substantiated, instrumentalist state is not
weak; it is awesomely powerful, indeed as is commonly said “sovereign,” in
virtue of its not being inconvenienced or embarrassed by the restraints of
higher law or, except by contingent concession, of other unities of order,
let alone by that other and superior perfect society that is the Church.
What the world needs is to recover the ontologically dense state, and
for this what is needed is a recovery of the deeper strands of Catholic
social doctrine, specifically those concerning the state’s place within an
order of higher law, and those concerning the rightful place of the
Church over and within the state and of a plurality of social forms that
deserve not only immunity from state power but freedom to fulfill what I
shall refer to (following Pope Pius XI and later Catholic social doctrine) as
their munera, their proper functions.  All of this is, as Henri De Lubac—
whom Pope Paul VI wished to create a Cardinal and whom Blessed Pope
John Paul II did create a Cardinal, in each instance for his theological
work—“no more than the Gospel requires.”10  It is a separate project to
construct states in defiance of the Gospel.
8. Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 3, at 4.
9. POPE PIUS XII, SUMMI PONTIFICATUS ¶ 59 (1939).
10. HENRI DE LUBAC, THE SPLENDOR OF THE CHURCH 194–95 (Michael Mason
trans., Ignatius Press 1986).
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III.
Lawyers like to work with examples, and here we can do no better
than to consider the timely matter of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Health Care Act recently upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States.  By way of background, recall that President Barack Obama signed
the Act into law in March of 2010.  The Act requires, among other things,
that most employers’ group health plans cover women’s “preventive care.”
Congress did not define this term, and so it fell to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to decide which “preventive services”
to include in the mandate.  A year after the statute was enacted, the HHS
announced that “preventive services” include contraceptives, abor-
tifacients, and sterilization.  HHS also announced that some “religious em-
ployers” would be exempt from the requirement.  According to the HHS,
the exemption covers only those entities whose purpose is “the inculcation
of religious values” and that hire and serve primarily people of the same
religious faith.  A parish or a seminary could meet this definition, but most
religious charities, schools, and hospitals would not.  Needless to say, the
distinction between “religion,” which is exempt, and corporate works of
charity undertaken by the Church, which are not exempt, does not reflect
the Catholic understanding of what it is to be Church in the world, but
that is to get ahead of the story.
In recently upholding the Act against numerous constitutional chal-
lenges, the Supreme Court did not answer, indeed it specifically reserved,
the question of whether the individual mandate as construed by HHS
would survive a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.11  Such a challenge has already been lodged.  On May 20, 2012,
forty-three religious institutions filed lawsuits in federal courts across the
United States, and many others have followed.  The terms of many of
these legal challenges track the rationale of the challenge pressed for
months in the media, led by the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (USCCB), among others, according to which such a requirement
violates the “religious liberty” of the Church by forcing her, as a condition
of doing the charitable work of God’s Church, to violate the moral law as
taught by the Church.
The likely results of the lawsuits are hard to predict, above all for the
reason that the U.S. Constitution has never been construed to protect the
libertas Ecclesiae, strictly speaking, or even of the liberty of churches, generi-
cally speaking.12  It is true, nonetheless, that there are precedents that,
11. “Other provisions of the Constitution also check congressional overreach-
ing.  A mandate to purchase a particular product would be unconstitutional if, for
example, the edict impermissibly abridged the freedom of speech, interfered with
the free exercise of religion, or infringed on a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.”  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting).
12. “Notwithstanding all of the data points in the previous paragraph, it re-
mains unclear and unsettled what exactly are the content and textual home in the
5
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taken together, could provide the Court some basis for finding in favor of
the Church.  I will mention just two examples.  In Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,13 decided in 2000, the Court upheld, in a 5-4 vote, the right of the
Boy Scouts not to have to accept homosexual scoutmasters on the ground
that to do so would violate the Scouts’ constitutionally protected freedom
of expressive association based in the First Amendment guarantee of free
speech.  In a second and related vein, in January 2012, in Hosana-Tabor
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,14 the Court held unanimously that the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment require
the availability of an “affirmative defense” against suits brought on behalf
of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of
employment discrimination laws.15  These and some other holdings pre-
sent some filaments that could perhaps be woven together into an argu-
ment that Church agencies have a right to be let alone.  And this is exactly
the point to underscore: these are arguments for groups to be let alone.
The cultural and societal push in favor of such argument, to the lim-
ited extent there is such a push, sounds in terms of “pluralism,” that is, the
desirability of a plurality of groups.  But why, we might well ask, should
such arguments prevail?  Why is more better in this context?  Or, more
technically, why is such pluralism normative?  Sometimes the answer is just
assumed or assumed away, as a sort of a fortiori from the presumed hegem-
ony of “diversity.”  A more common but still crude account teaches that
civil society is stabilized by power checking power, and this is an account
with a familiar if dubious intellectual pedigree and aim.16  A third ac-
count, which lends some indirect support to the predicates—though not
necessarily the aims—of the second, is that groups or, to speak more tech-
Constitution for the church-autonomy principle—or even, indeed, if there is such
a ‘principle.’  It does not seem unfair to suggest that the doctrine has something of
an emanations-and-penumbras air about it.”  Richard Garnett, The Freedom of the
Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 59, 76 (2007).
13. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
14. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
15. “We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an
otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.  That is because the issue
presented by the exception is ‘whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle
him to relief,’ not whether the court has ‘power to hear [the] case.’”  Hosana-
Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 709 n.4 (2012) (altera-
tion in original) (citation omitted).  The significance of the constitutional limits
being an “affirmative defense” rather than a jurisdictional bar is huge, as Mark
Strasser has seen, though from what I regard as the wrong point of view. See Mark
Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the
Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution (Feb. 2012), available at http://works.
bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=mark_strasser; cf. Gregory
A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Ex-
ception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 43 (2008) (defending a subject-matter jurisdictional position); see also
Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration 97
(Sept. 4, 2012) (unpublished manuscript).
16. MANENT, supra note 6, at 53–64.
6
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nically, associations, have an irreducible ontological reality that calls for
acknowledgment, at least by realists.
To this third view the great nineteenth-century English jurist F.W.
Maitland gave memorable voice:
“When” . . . “a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred
thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way
for some common purpose, they create a body, which by no fic-
tion of law, but by the very nature of things, differs from the indi-
viduals of whom it is constituted.”
. . . .
If the law allows men to form permanently organized groups,
those groups will be for common opinion right-and-duty bearing
units; and if the law-giver will not openly treat them as such, he
will misrepresent, or, as the French say, he will “denature” the
facts . . . .  For the morality of common sense the group is a per-
son, is right-and-duty bearing unit.17
On this account, when individuals, with the intention of stable order,
engage in united action for a common purpose, the result is a new exis-
tent, a unity that transcends the aggregation of its parts.  In other words, a
group person or what St. Thomas refers to as a unity of order comes into
existence.18  When this happens, Maitland notes, we are required to recog-
nize “n + 1 persons.”  To do otherwise would be, again, to “de-nature the
facts.”  It is conceded that groups are not ontologically basic in the order
of substances or substantial unities.  “They are basic, however, in constitut-
ing a unity that excels parts (members) which are also wholes (natural
persons).”19  As a bearer of rights and responsibilities, an association, like
a substantial unity, “can harm or be harmed in the moral sense of the
term.”20
In its strongest form, then, pluralism of the sort I just have been sum-
marizing is a plea not to de-nature the facts.  Those who grant the facts, how-
ever, can counter that the state may have good and sufficient reason to
require through law that associations conform to the extrinsic norms of
positive law.  The point is concessum as concerns a spectrum of associations
17. F.W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 63, 68 (David Runciman
& Magnus Ryan eds., 2003); see also DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE PERSON-
ALITY OF THE STATE 89–123 (1997).
18. Russell Hittinger, The Coherence of the Four Basic Principles of Catholic Social
Doctrine—An Interpretation, in PURSUING THE COMMON GOOD: HOW SOLIDARITY AND
SUBSIDIARITY CAN WORK TOGETHER 75, 87 n.24 (Margaret S. Archer & Pierpaolo
Donati eds., 2008)
19. See id. at 87; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies:
The Case of Lasallians, Families, Schools—and the Poor, 45 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD.
131, 151–54 (2006).
20. See Russell Hittinger, The Coherence of the Four Basic Principles of Catholic So-
cial Doctrine—An Interpretation, in PURSUING THE COMMON GOOD: HOW SOLIDARITY
AND SUBSIDIARITY CAN WORK TOGETHER, supra note 18, at 88.
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but not, however, with respect to the Church, which is not, in the relevant
sense, just an “association.”  When it comes to the Church, she has a divine
right to exercise a direct jurisdiction with which the state may not inter-
fere, at least not without the Church’s concession.  To insist on this point
is to risk being murdered in a cathedral, however, as T.S. Eliot recalled in
1935 writing of the consequences “the absence of a cathartic moment of a
repentant state.”21  So, for reasons of safety, I merely mention it and move
on.
Returning to my main line of argument, we need to augment the
analysis by introducing the technical term “civil society,” a protean but
prodigious contributor to contemporary debate about the limits of govern-
ment.  In his book Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, political
philosopher Ernest Gellner refers to the “miracle of Civil Society,” which
he defines as:
[T]hat set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is
strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not
preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace
and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent
it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.22
I will mention two problems with Gellner’s instrumentalist account of
civil society.  First, it would seem to allow defense of civil society principally
on the ground that “useful goods, including liberty, are more efficiently
produced and distributed by non-governmental agents.”23  Indeed, ac-
cording to Gellner, civil society is the “social residue left when the state is
subtracted.”24  The trouble with this defense of the non-state association is
that it reduces the private sector to exactly—neither more nor less than—
what it can do most efficiently and to what mutually checking powers are
needed to check the power of the state.  Harvard political scientist Nancy
Rosenblum supplements this generic efficiency defense of civil society with
the specific efficiency that a pluralism of private associations lets off the
21. Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note 3, at 17.
As the late Harold Berman wrote,
The conflict between Becket and Henry was essentially a conflict over the
scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; it was thus a paradigm of the Papal
Revolution, which established throughout the West two types of compet-
ing political-legal authority, the spiritual and the secular.  One effect of
this dualism was to enhance the political-legal authority of kings in the
secular sphere.  Another effect was to create tensions at the boundaries of
royal and papal jurisdictions.  These tensions were resolved in different
ways in different kingdoms.  Their resolution in England was strongly in-
fluenced by circumstances of Becket’s martyrdom.
BERMAN, supra note 2, at 260.
22. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 5
(1994).
23. Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in THE FIRST GRACE 269 (2003).
24. GELLNER, supra note 22, at 212.
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steam of values that are illiberal and therefore inconsistent with the ideals
of liberal democracy.25
The second and related problem with a purely instrumentalist de-
fense of civil society, also from a functionalist perspective, is that it pro-
vides no traction to resist government efforts on behalf of what
Rosenblum and Yale Law dean Robert Post refer to disarmingly as “con-
gruence.”  They explain that:
The “logic of congruence” envisions civil society as reflecting
common values and practices “all the way down.”
Congruence is often advocated with regard to the egalitarian
norms of liberal democracy.  The claim is that the internal lives
of associations should mirror public norms of equality, nondis-
crimination, due process, and so on.  In the United States, for
example, norms of equality and due process have been imposed
on vast areas of social life, even on small, informal associations.26
Rosenblum and Post were writing a decade ago, but note how per-
fectly the Obama Administration’s arguments for equal access to “preven-
tive services” exemplify an application of the logic of congruence, one to
which Gellner’s social residue provides no resistance.  Rosenblum and
Post perhaps counseled something of a cautious modus vivendi between the
aspirations of congruence and the particularist pluralism of civil society,27
but the unavailing quality of such articles of peace is now unmistakable.
The downgraded state that is ontologically thin becomes the powerful, im-
posing agent of the preferences of the majority.  As Rosenblum and Post
explain:
Advocates of congruence fear that the multiplication of interme-
diate institutions does not mediate but balkanizes public life.
They are apprehensive that plural associations and groups am-
plify self-interest, encourage arrant interest-group politics, exag-
gerate cultural egocentrism, and defy government.  What is
needed, in their view, is a strong assertion of public values and
policies designed to loosen the hold of particular affiliations, so
that members will be empowered to look beyond their groups
and to identify themselves as members of the larger political
community.  The “logic of congruence” envisions civil society as
reflecting common values and practices “all the way down.”28
25. See Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in THE FIRST GRACE, supra
note 23, at 269.
26. CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 13 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C.
Post eds., 2002).
27. See id. at 17.
28. See id. at 13.
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The ontologically thin state Rosenblum and Post defend turns out to
be as potentially powerful as one can imagine, even as it masquerades
under the unassuming mask of “congruence.”
IV.
It is fair to say that since the mid-nineteenth century, liberalism and
Catholic social doctrine have been alike in their attentiveness to limits on
the state.  But whereas liberals valued civil society mainly for its instrumen-
tal—and, as we have seen, mostly illusory—ability to check the state, Cath-
olic social doctrine has recognized and sought to multiply the intrinsic
perfections of societies or associations.  What “social residue” defenses of
civil society, such as Gellner’s, systematically ignore (and implicitly deny)
is the intrinsic value of such social forms as the family and the Church,
including the manifold manifestations of the Church in schools, colleges,
convents, monasteries, hospitals, and so forth.  What they also ignore or
wish to deny, therefore, is that such unities of order are bearers of irreduc-
ible authority.  “Residue” is no repository of genuine authority, but valid
associations are.29
The Catholic view comes into focus if we attend to the notion of the
munus regale—that is, the particular function, mission, gift, or vocation that
is ruling.  Beginning with the pontificate of Pius XI, this notion of the
munus regale in which humans participate—and it is a “participation,” for
there is only one true King—has been applied beyond its earlier Christo-
logical and ecclesiological boundaries to the offices, rights, and duties of
social institutions.  Properly understood, the notion of munus regale pre-
serves but corrects the liberal’s doctrine of social pluralism.30
The Latin word munus is best, if imperfectly, translated into English as
“function.”  What is lost in the translation that must be preserved is that
the word connotes gift-giving.  This is reflected in the English word munif-
icent, from the Latin munificus, meaning generous or bountiful.  The word
community, communitas, derives from the sharing of gifts.  The Magi gave
munera to the Christ child.  And Christians speak of the triplex munus
Christi: priest, prophet, and king.31
In the encyclical Divini Redemptoris, for example, Pope Pius XI wrote
as follows:
We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be restored ac-
cording to the true principles of a sane corporative system which
respects the proper hierarchic structure of society; and how all
the occupational groups should be fused into a harmonious unity
29. See Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in THE FIRST GRACE, supra
note 23, at 272.
30. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine,
in CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 13–17, 22–23 (Jeanne Heffernan Schindler ed.,
2008).
31. Id. at 389–90.
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inspired by the principle of the common good.  And the genuine
and chief [munus] of public and civil authority consists precisely
in the efficacious furthering of this harmony and coordination of
all social forces.32
Pope Pius XI’s immediate successor, Pope Pius XII, continued to develop
and apply this ontology, as here in the encyclical Summi Pontificatus: “It is
the noble prerogative and [munus] of the [civitas] to control, aid, and di-
rect the private and individual activities of national life that they converge
harmoniously towards the common good.”33
The development and application of the munera has continued down
to the present, and it is worth noting that Latin edition of the Catechismus
Catholicae Ecclesiae uses the word munus at least 125 times, and the 1983
Code of Canon Law uses the term nearly 190 times.34  My present pur-
pose, though, is not to chart the later development and application of the
concept but to establish its meaning in the Pian encyclicals and to see what
light it sheds on the current debate about the contraceptive mandate and
what the Church has to say about it.
We do not know exactly who or what moved Pius XI to apply the
sacral concept of munera to the juridical realm.35  We do know that begin-
ning with Leo XIII’s encyclical Annum Sacrum in 1899, the popes delved
more and more deeply into Christ and His ruling powers, and Pius XI in a
series of six encyclicals—beginning with Ubi Arcano and Quas Primas and
finishing with Divini Redemptoris—articulated the analogies between
Christ’s unique munus regale and the munera of baptized Christians.
Whereas in the Leonine period individuals and associations were said to
bear iura et officia, with Pius XI they were frequently said to bear munera,
which are in fact the source of the iura.36
The idea of munus beautifully conjoins the Aristotelian notion of an
ergon or function with the more biblical concept of vocation or mission.37
With this Pius got at something that was occluded in the conventional
Thomism of the time.  The key point is that at the time of Pius XI’s pontifi-
cate (1922-1939), the pressing question of social doctrine was not just
whether man was a social animal naturally ordered to a common good in
the state, but, more precisely, the status of societies and social roles other
32. POPE PIUS XI, DIVINI REDEMPTORIS ¶ 32 (1937)
33. SUMMI PONTIFICATUS, supra note 9, ¶ 59.
34. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine,
in CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 13–14.
35. Id. at 391.  This development occurred in the context of a renewed recov-
ered of a richer ecclesiology. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XII, MYSTICI CORPORIS ¶ 61
(1943).  Paragraph 61 of the encyclical especially reflects the ontology developed
by Pius XI in terms of munera.
36. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine,
in CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 14 n.15.
37. Id. at 392.  For a discussion of the Aristotelian notion of an ergon, see 1
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1097b23–1098a19.
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than the state.  It was these that the totalitarians stripped of their group
personality.  Therefore, as Russell Hittinger explains, “[I]t wasn’t enough
just to repeat the standard formulae of commutative, distributive, and le-
gal justice.  Without social content, these formulae serve no useful pur-
pose.  In fact, arguments to the common good can prove counter-
productive in the face of the modern state, which is more than happy to
make common the entire range of goods”38—or, more to the point, of
false goods.  Think, for example, of the logic of “congruence” and equal
access to “preventive services.”  But this is to get ahead of the story again.
The point to emphasize first is that Pius wished to emphasize that
rights are not derived from human nature considered in the abstract; in-
stead, the right is settled and rights are then predicated on the basis of
antecedent munera.  We are accustomed in law to consider rights as immu-
nities—im-munitas, etymologically, implies the absence of a munus.39  But
this gets things backwards.  Pius XI’s achievement was to establish that an
adequate account of the social order cannot proceed in the first place
from immunities or negative rights.  We must begin with the munera that
the immunities and rights in turn vindicate.  The civil ruling authority dis-
covers—he does not assign—munera that are assigned by creation and re-
demption, that is, by the natural law and by the divine or ecclesiastical law,
respectively.  Nor does the civil ruling authority assign a Catholic hospital
its munus; this the Church does, and it is for the civil ruling authority to
discover it.
Discovering is not all the civil ruling authority is to do, however.  It
must also facilitate or, perhaps better, harmonize40 the plural societies in
their achievement of their assigned munera, and to do so is exactly to
achieve social justice, that misunderstood term that just means, as Pius XI
teaches in Divini Redemptoris, that the common good is to be realized
through munera-bearing associations and institutions.41  The munus of the
38. Id. at 393.
39. Id.
40. I pursued a particular example of this work of “harmonizing” in Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies, supra note 19.  For a general and
helpfully technical treatment of the relationship between parts and wholes in a
community as understood by Aquinas, see Michael Baur, Law and Natural Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AQUINAS 238, 238–44 (Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump
eds., 2012).
41. Pope Pius XI wrote,
Verum enim vero, praeter iustitiam, quam commutativam vocant, socialis
etiam iustitia colenda est, quae quidem ipsa officia postulat, quibus
neque artifices neque heri se subducere possunt.  Atqui socialis iustitiae
est id omne ab singulis exigere, quod ad commune bonum necessarium
sit.  Ut autem, ad quamlibet viventis corporis compagem quod attinet, in
universum consultum non est, nisi singulis membris ea omnia tribuantur,
quibus eadem indigeant ad suas partes explendas; ita, ad communitatis
constitutionem temperationemque quod pertinet, totius societatis bono
prospici non potest, nisi singulis membris, hominibus videlicet personae
dignitate ornatis, illud omne impertiatur, quod iisdem opus sit, ad sociale
munus cuiusque suum exercendum.  Si igitur iustitiae sociali provisum fuerit,
12
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Church is assigned by divine positive law, but most munera are assigned by
the divine natural law.  With respect to the latter point, as St. Thomas
argues in his opusculum Contra Impugnantes, free associations are valuable
and to be respected—and their works harmonized—because they make
communication possible, by which Thomas means making something com-
mon, or, more precisely, one rational agent participating in the life of an-
other and generating and sharing intelligibilities that would otherwise go
unachieved.42  To quote Hittinger:“[T]o prevent free men and women
from associating for the purpose of communicating gifts is contrary to the
natural law.  It is tantamount to denying to rational agents the perfection
proper to their nature, and denying the commonweal goods it would not
enjoy were it not for free associations”—and, I would add, the intrinsic
perfections capable only within it.43
And it is here that that other frequently misunderstood and abused
principle of Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity, enters, for it is derived
from social justice.  Subsidiarity is the principle that when aid or subsidium
be given either by the parts to the whole or by the whole to the parts, the
“manifold organicity” of the common good is to be respected and aided,
not destroyed or absorbed.44  Properly understood, subsidiarity is not (as
is commonly thought) a principle of devolution or smallness of scale;
rather, it is a principle of non-absorption predicated on the facts, estab-
lished by creation or redemption, that groups have irreducible munera to
fulfill and gifts to give.  Subsidiarity cannot create a social ontology; sub-
sidiarity presupposes the existence of social forms, each having its own esse
ex oeconomicis rebus uberes enascentur actuosae navitatis fructus, qui in
tranquillitatis ordine maturescent, Civitatisque vim firmitudinemque os-
tendent; quemadmodum humani corporis valetudo ex imperturbata,
plena fructuosaque eius opera dignoscitur.
DIVINI REDEMPTORIS, supra note 32, ¶ 51 (1939).  Christian employers and industri-
alists have a proper munus: “Quapropter vos peculiari modo compellamus, christi
ani heri officinarumque domini, quibus proprium est saepenumero tam difficile
munus, quandoquidem illam errorum quasi hereditatem ab iniusto oeconomi-
carum rerum regimine excepistis, quod in tot hominum aetates ruinose influxit:
officiorum memores estote, quibus respondere debetis.” Id. ¶ 50.
Catholic working men also have a “munus” to make the Church known in their
places of work:
Patris heic animo alloqui carissimos Nobis catholicos opifices, vel adoles-
cente vel adulta aetate, libet, qui ob strenue servatam fidem in tanta
temporum iniquitate, honestum arduumque onus et munus, loco
praemii, accepisse videantur. . . .  Quod quidem munus, ad fodinas, ad
officinas, ad armamentaria, quocumque denique opus initur, profer-
endum, cum incommoda quandoque postulet, meminerint catholici
iidem operarii Christum Iesum cum operis exemplo, perpessionis
quoque exemplum coniunxisse.
Id. ¶ 70.
42. Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in THE FIRST GRACE, supra note
23, at 271.
43. Id. at 272.
44. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine,
in CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 15.
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proprium, its own munus to be done and given.  These munera are participa-
tions in the munus regale of Christ the King, which means that they are
measured and ruled by the measure and rule of Christ’s rational will for
the community and its common good.
In sum, then, civil society is not accurately conceived as an arbitrary
“plurality” or, worse, an undifferentiated and tractionless “residue.” What
we confront, instead, are individuals with their respective munera and as-
sociations with their respective munera, all of them arrayed under and
within the state and the Church, as the case may be, sometimes in an over-
lapping jurisdiction, each of which individual or member association bear-
ing its own respective munus to be performed or given.  The state’s munus
is the temporal common good and, furthermore, collateral contribution
to the achievement of the supernatural common good by, in part, harmo-
nizing plural societies according to social justice and the derivative princi-
ple of subsidiarity.  And the Church’s munus is to accomplish the divine
will that all be saved,45 in part by ensouling the state.  The result, then, is
an ontologically dense state that is not vulnerable to arbitrary impositions
by a willful civil society, because it is girded and powered from within, so to
speak, by munera that must be discharged, by gifts that demand to be
given, because they are participations in the munus of Christ, who rules
from above.
V.
As I signaled at the outset, the commonly heard “Catholic” objection
to the HHS mandate for “preventive services” is that the mandate “violates
religious liberty.”  Perhaps this is so, but I find the expression woefully
vague and, to the extent it can be clarified, under-inclusive, so to speak, of
the Catholic social doctrine I have just summarized.  Here, for example, is
the pivotal language in the USCCB’s much-discussed document, “Our
First, Most Cherished Liberty:”
The mandate of the Department of Health and Human Services
has received wide attention and has been met with our vigorous
and united opposition.  In an unprecedented way, the federal
government will both force religious institutions to facilitate and
fund a product contrary to their own moral teaching and purport
to define which religious institutions are “religious enough” to
merit protection of their religious liberty.  These features of the
“preventive services” mandate amount to an unjust law.  As Arch-
bishop-designate William Lori of Baltimore, Chairman of the Ad
Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty, testified to Congress: “This
is not a matter of whether contraception may be prohibited by the
government.  This is not even a matter of whether contraception
may be supported by the government.  Instead, it is a matter of
45. 1 Timothy 2:4.
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whether religious people and institutions may be forced by the
government to provide coverage for contraception or steriliza-
tion, even if that violates their religious beliefs.46
I will begin with the last point.  The document claims that the prob-
lem with the mandate is that “we,” the Catholic Church, are being forced
to do something that we Catholics regard as immoral, or, as Timothy Car-
dinal Dolan, the Archbishop of New York and President of the USCCB,
put the point elsewhere, something that violates “our standard of respect-
ing . . . religious liberty.”47  With all due respect, this is a remarkably self-
referential position.  As Francis Cardinal George recently wrote, “Among
the sayings of Jesus, there are about as many that start ‘Woe to you . . .’ as
there are those that begin ‘Blessed are they . . .’”48 and Jesus did not limit
their effects to “us.”  It is a diversion to frame the issue concerning the
mandate as exclusively, or even principally, as about what the Church is be-
ing forced to do.  That is only the start of it.  The problem with this law is
not just that it forces us (“the Church”) to do what we regard as immoral; it
is not just that it forces us and others to do what we and they regard as
immoral.  The problem is also and above all that it forces us and others to
do what is immoral, regardless of who does or does not consider it to be
immoral.  It is not anyone’s disagreement with the required act that makes
the required act objectionable; the final cause of the act itself is sufficient
to make the act immoral.49  (The degree of individual culpability is, of
course, another question—and one that is perhaps affected by the Bish-
ops’ own disavowals and bashfulness).
The munera of both the Church and the state include the work of
making the moral law effective in human living, yet in the face of the
state’s acting in violation of the moral law, the Bishops overtly disowned—
in the language I quoted and will quote in part again—their munus to
exhort state and citizens to conform the positive law to the moral law:
“This is not even a matter of whether contraception may be supported by
the government.”  I am afraid that the Bishops’ position boils down to a
plea to be let alone.  Cardinal Dolan is in accord: “That’s all it’s really
about: religious freedom.  It’s not about access to contraception, as much
as our local newspaper—surprise!—insists it is.  The Church is hardly try-
ing to impose its views on society, but rather resisting the government’s
46. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OUR FIRST, MOST CHERISHED LIB-
ERTY: A STATEMENT ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2012), available at http://www.usccb.
org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/our-first-most-cherished-liberty.cfm.
47. Timothy M. Dolan, Cardinal-designate, Letter to Bishops (Feb. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/290854/all-bishops-letter-led-
cardinal-designate-dolan-we-strongly-protest-violation-our-free (emphasis added).
48. Francis Cardinal George, Chicago Values, Revisited: It’s not About Chicken!,
CATHOLIC CHICAGO BLOG (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.archchicago.org/blog/com-
ments.aspx?PostID=278.
49. POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE (1968).
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attempt to force its view on us.”50  Cardinal Dolan continues: “Vast and
unfettered access to chemical contraceptives and abortifacients—all easier
to get, they tell me, than beer and cigarettes—will continue.  If you think
it’s still not enough, then subsidize them if you insist.  Just don’t make us
provide them and pay for them!”51  Needless to say, the Church cannot, as
a practical matter, “impose” her views on society, so that’s a red herring.
Surely, however, the Church can at least propose “her views,” especially
through the episcopal munus, rather than just going inside and
underground.
Returning from the specific point to the general, here again is Cardi-
nal Dolan’s overall approach in action: “We just want to be left alone to live
out the imperatives of our faith to serve, teach, heal, feed, and care for
others.”52  Cardinal Dolan’s rhetorical (and theological?) starting point is
too cramped.  Self-marginalization or abnegation, verging perhaps on self-
imposed exile, is exactly what an ecclesial society with gifts to give cannot
do.  If it is to be true to its munera, it will seek to correct and transform the
culture as God commands and wishes us—qua Church—to do.  The
Church’s claim is not to be “left alone”: it is to change the world, including
through the good deeds mentioned by Cardinal Dolan.  At the risk of bela-
boring the obvious, the munus regale of the hierarchy is not confined to the
sacristy and the munus regale of the laity is not confined to the home.  As to
the munus of the laity, the Second Vatican Council is quite emphatic that
the laity’s role is “to impress the divine law on the earthly city.”53  To im-
press is not to remain passive.  The Council also teaches that it does not
fall to the laity “exclusively” to perform that work.54  Other than the laity
are the clergy (including the hierarchy).  There is no additional category
of natural actors: the disjunction is exhaustive.  (Religious, whether men
or women, are not, as such, clergy).  This teaching of the Second Vatican
Council, about impressing the divine law on the earthly city, is impossible
to square with the following: “Just don’t make us provide them and pay for
them!”55  The rest of the world can go to hell—just don’t contaminate
“us”!56
50. Timothy M. Dolan, Freedom Is Worth Defending, CATHOLIC NEW YORK (May
31, 2012), http://www.cny.org/stories/Freedom-Is-Worth-Defending,7568.
51. Id.
52. Timothy Cardinal Dolan, Religious Freedom and Protecting Healthcare for Wo-
men, THE GOSPEL IN THE DIGITAL AGE  (Mar. 16, 2012), http://blog.archny.org/
index.php/religious-freedom-and-protecting-healthcare-for-women-and-children/.
53. POPE PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 43 (1965); see also POPE PAUL VI, LUMEN
GENTIUM ¶ 31 (1964).
54. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 53, ¶ 43 (“Laicis proprie, etsi non exclusive,
saecularia officia et navitates competent.”).
55. See Timothy M. Dolan, supra note 50 (emphasis added).
56. Some Catholic thinkers, including the Popes, before the mid-twentieth
century saw this coming: “they feared that once the state was depicted instrumen-
talist terms, the other organs of society would inevitably follow suit.  In other
words, they feared that the liberal state, even in its most favorable depiction as an
instrument rather than the substance of the common good, would produce atom-
16
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What the argument exclusively from “religious freedom” neglects—or,
rather, often intentionally suppresses—is the fact that the Church and her
charities are entitled to freedom not just because of a brute right to be let
alone, a right not to be interfered with, or, in other words, an immunity.
Rights to be let alone are derivative, as we have seen, of the various associa-
tions’ respective particular munera, the works and functions they are
charged to perform.  The sufficient reason to let schools, adoption agen-
cies, and all the rest, including hospitals, go about their work unhindered is
that social justice and subsidiarity demand it.  They demand it because the
Church has entrusted her munus of charity to these particular associations
which are capable, as Pope Benedict XVI stressed in the encyclical Deus
Caritas Est, echoing Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum Novarum, of deliver-
ing what the state could never do or even simulate,57 and all of that is no
less than what Christ the King commands His Church to do.  The reason
the state is legally obligated, not merely obliged, to respect the Church’s
governance of her member organs, including hospitals, is that, by divine
law, the Church enjoys a real, direct, and final jurisdiction over herself and
her members.  But this does not mean that the Church is not also charged
by divine law to correct and transform the world.
Some defend the exclusivity of the “just let us alone” argument on
prudential grounds.  I respect those who honestly defend such a position,
despite its glaring incompleteness, and although I do indeed see some cir-
cumstance-specific (viz., late post-Modernity) merit to this line of argu-
ment, I am not persuaded, certainly not of its sufficiency.  Does it not
bespeak a much deeper and unacceptable abdication and resignation, in
the face of a deadly political morality, of the munus regale?  Regardless of
the prudence vel non of that argument, though, there is, I must concede,
some fairly prestigious precedent for such a defense.  I refer to the Second
Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae Par.
13, which states that the libertas Ecclesiae is “principium fundamentale” gov-
erning relations between the Church and government and the whole civil
order.  The teaching of Diginitatis is not infallible as a matter of Catholic
theology, however, and I am afraid that on this point, at least, it is mis-
taken.  As Marcel Lefebvre once explained:
Freedom is not the fundamental principle, nor a fundamental
principle in the matter.  The public law of the Church is founded
on the State’s duty to recognize the social royalty of Our Lord
Jesus Christ!  The fundamental principle which governs the rela-
tions between Church and State is the “He must reign” of St.
Paul: Oportet illum regnare (I Cor. 15:25)—the reign that ap-
ism and instrumentalism in every other sector of society.”  Hittinger, supra note 25,
at 267.
57. POPE BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST ¶¶ 28b, 31 (2005); POPE LEO XIII,
RERUM NOVARUM ¶ 30 (1891).
17
Brennan: "Religious Freedom," The Individual Mandate, and Gifts: On Why th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-3\VLR303.txt unknown Seq: 18 23-APR-13 8:44
454 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 437
plies not only to the Church but must be foundation of the tem-
poral city.58
It is a permanently valid principle of Catholic social doctrine—be-
cause it is the one historical inevitability—that Christ must reign.  As the early
Christians understood and taught, creation itself was for the sake of the
Church,59 and the munus of the Church is not merely the maintenance of
some internal freedom for the benefit of the faithful already graced to be
inside the bomb shelter; it is, as well, as it was in the first place, to serve,
among other functions, as the soul of the body politic, and thus to contrib-
ute to the achievement of the common goods, both natural and
supernatural.
VI.
I will conclude by quoting the last paragraph of my “Decreasing Onto-
logical Density” paper:
One can affirm that the Church is sacred in a way that the state,
properly understood, is not, without having to deny that the state
is possessed of a share of sacred ruling authority.  If what author-
ity for rule the state possesses is in no way sacred, however, then
it can be no part of the divine ruling power.  Do we humans have
a self-possessed power to rule, a rival to the divine [rule]?  If have
we have not received a law, then on what basis do we proceed to
make law?  In one of my favorite lines of all time, Justice Antonin
Scalia opined that “God,” not man, “applies the natural law.”  If
that be true, what, then, do we do?  Inasmuch as a devoutly Cath-
olic Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States has con-
signed us to a fate without benefit of the natural law, the
question is not merely speculative.60
The only adequate answer, I see more clearly than I did five years ago,
is a proper cooperation between—not the separation of—Church and
state.  The Church was not founded to repose in a gilded cage but, in-
stead, to save men’s souls and, to that end, to correct and transform this
fallen creation.  “Although the world knows it not, the most primordial law
of ruling is service, which is always the signature of the divine.  Not sover-
eignty as the moderns understand it, but rather a gift communicated for
the good of another.”61
58. MICHAEL DAVIES, 2 APOLOGIA PRO MARCEL LEFEBVRE 122 (1983).
59. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 760 (1999).
60. Brennan, supra note 1, at 279 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
61. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Doctrine,
in CHRISTIANITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 19 (footnote omitted).
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